I was lucky to get an invite to the CSIT 2012 cyber security summit.
Credit to the CSIT team in Belfast for creating a unique atmosphere which got the balance absolutely right - not too academic for industry to feel excluded, government participation without the grandstanding or justification sometimes seen, and plenty of opportunity for detailed open discussion amongst global delegates from industry, academia and government.
I attended for three reasons. Firstly, I spent the first 8 years of my software career designing secure communications (a patent from back when I worked at Motorola).
Secondly, I want to advocate against locking-down aspects of the internet in the name of security because I passionately believe open societies are stronger societies, and this applies equally to cyberspace.
And finally I wanted to discuss our work on privacy as an enabler to cyber security.
When each of us act with a high degree of autonomy, taking responsibility for our own personal data and protecting our own systems due to our inherent desire for privacy, I believe our networks as a whole will be more secure than if we defer to governments as our primary cyber defender.
This was a recurring theme throughout discussions.
There is what was referred to as an asymmetry in human resources faced by those tasked with securing our networks: relatively small numbers of professionals with varying skill levels facing off against legions of online activists and cyber criminals with an impressive skill set and access to most of the same tools (or 'weapons') as governments.
It went unsaid but one can only assume some nation states have also their own legions.
In a democracy we should be able to rely on citizens to augment the work of government in securing our networks, but for this to happen we need both mutual trust between citizens and government security agencies, and for citizens to feel motivated and able to help.
Specifically on privacy there are additional reasons why privacy can be an enabler to cyber security.
All sections of society are vulnerable to data loss through their ordinary everyday use of the internet. Lack of data privacy can become a national security risk when personal data of those in sensitive positions becomes accessible to those with hostile intent, who may use private information to extort or to blackmail.
Whilst traditionally privacy has been seen in some quarters as at odds with security and policing requirements - e.g. the use of network monitoring tools to spot threats and investigate crime - there's also an argument against this.
In some cases a focus on intrusive policing and intelligence-gathering techniques can come at the expense of developing more sustainable community-based policing models for cyberspace.
Information technology is still developing apace, therefore capability-based policing - a reliance on a power available only to police and security forces such as network monitoring, data seizure etc - will for a while at least remain a costly arms race.
Soon after each capability is installed in our networks either technology evolves, requiring further upgrades, or the bad guys up their game leaving the capability obsolete, or both.
A worse scenario exists: the capability might be exploited by the bad guys.
Take the data retention directive, the EU law (which as far as I can establish the UK lobbied for) compels ISPs to store information which might be useful to law enforcement for a period of 6 months to 2 years.
All this potentially exploitable data sitting around in huge silos at ISPs. A capability that is also clearly vulnerable to exploit, especially given the security of such data is in the hands of private companies.
Employees have in the past looked up private data from company databases and sold this information to private detectives working for divorce lawyers, journalists and criminals.
It's not a straight choice between privacy and security. It's a balance between privacy as an enabler to creating a more secure information culture and privacy-invasive policing as a tool to detect and prevent cyber crime.
UPDATE: also, one must not overlook the importance of public trust and the benefits of consensual policing. Invasive monitoring can cause mistrust between the public and security services.
Public trust and confidence in the work of the security forces is a bigger asset, even, than the ability to monitor all electronic communications. A consensual approach makes society stronger and inherently stable.